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ABSTRACT
While prior studies tend to view hospital integration through the lens of horizontal consolidation,
I provide an analysis of its vertical aspects. I examine the effect of hospital acquisitions in New York
State on the distribution of market share for major cardiac procedures across providers in target
markets.  I  find  evidence  of  benefits  to  acquirers  via  business  stealing,  with  the  resulting
redistribution of volume across providers having small effects, if any, on total welfare with respect
to cardiac care. The results of this analysis--along with similar assessments for other services--can








I.    INTRODUCTION 
    
Studies of industry consolidation typically assume that the specific form of 
integration under consideration can be neatly categorized as either horizontal or vertical.  
Nevertheless, in certain industries, it is difficult to classify integration in this manner.  
The American hospital industry—which has experienced a dramatic increase in 
consolidation activity over the past twenty years
1—represents one such sector.  For 
example, consider a market in which all hospitals provide routine obstetrics, but only a 
few provide complex cardiac surgery.  The consolidation of any two hospitals in this 
market would, by definition, reduce the number of firms providing obstetrics, but may 
leave the number of firms providing cardiac surgery unchanged.  Referral patterns for 
cardiac surgery may change and could either increase or decrease measures of market 
concentration.  Whether a consolidation in this market should be viewed as horizontal or 
vertical thus depends upon the service considered. 
Most previous studies of hospital integration have relied on the horizontal model,
2 
suggesting that consolidation may, in theory, affect social welfare via two countervailing 
channels: increased market power and greater efficiency.  An attractive feature of the 
horizontal model is that it allows one readily to infer the effect of a merger on price and 
cost.  Horizontal consolidation, by definition, increases market concentration, so one can 
                                                           
 
1 See Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1999) for an overview of recent consolidation activity in the 
health care industry.  Between 1980 and 1993, the annual number of hospital consolidations in the United 
States remained relatively stable at between 10 and 30 transactions per year (American Hospital 
Association, 1992; Modern Healthcare, 1994-2000).  The number of transactions, however, jumped to 100 
in 1994 and reached a peak of 198 in 1998 before declining to 142 in 1999 (Modern Healthcare, 1994-
2000).  
2 Melnick et al. (1992), Dranove and Ludwick (1999), and Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger (1999) 
provide support for the view that increased market concentration allows hospitals to increase their prices.  
Noether (1988) finds that both price and quality competition are greater in less concentrated markets,  
2 
estimate the impact of consolidation simply by examining the effect of increases in 
market concentration—typically measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI)
3—
on key welfare determinants such as price and cost.  This approach is common in many 
studies of hospital competition (e.g., Noether, 1988; Melnick et al., 1992; Dranove and 
Ludwick, 1999; Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger, 1999; Kessler and McClellan, 2002). 
The pure horizontal model, however, is not well equipped to explain the impact of 
hospital consolidation on markets for more complex services (e.g., cardiac surgery) that 
are often provided by only one of the two parties to a given transaction.  For these 
services, hospital consolidation joins complements, rather than substitutes, in production, 
with an ambiguous impact on market concentration.  Further, to the extent that hospitals 
providing these complex services have substantially differentiated levels of quality and 
cost, the transfer of cases across a fixed number of firms could have implications for 
welfare.  For example, shifts in volume from low-quality to high-quality providers might 
improve overall welfare regardless of whether those shifts increase or decrease market 
concentration. 
In this paper, I supplement existing horizontal studies by considering what I will 
refer to as the vertical aspects of hospital integration.  I focus on the impact of 
consolidation on the provision of two complex cardiac procedures—coronary artery 
bypass graft (CABG) surgery and percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty 
(PTCA).  Cardiac procedures are the subject of this study for several reasons.  First, they 
represent a profitable and sizeable source of revenue for hospitals (Appleby, 2002; 
                                                                                                                                                                             
though the impact of concentration on observed prices is not significant.  Lynk (1995) suggests that 
consolidations may enable hospitals to lower costs by reducing the impact of variability in demand.  
3 
Kowalczyk, 2003).  Second, they require substantial fixed investments (New York State 
Department of Health, 2004) in equipment and dedicated staff, creating the potential for 
consolidation to improve efficiency by exploiting economies of scale in production.  
Third, because a significant portion of patients receiving CABG and PTCA die in the 
hospital, the variation in average mortality among hospitals is large enough to make it a 
meaningful quality measure.  I consider how acquisition events among hospitals in New 
York State between 1992 and 1999
4 affected the distribution of cardiac patients across 
firms and the average cost and quality of care.   
A small number of studies have considered the impact of consolidation on explicit 
quality in health care settings (e.g., Baker and Brown, 1999; Ho and Hamilton, 2000; 
Kessler and McClellan, 2000).
5  Like prior studies that have examined the quality of 
cardiac care, this paper uses risk-adjusted patient mortality as the relevant measure of 
quality.  Detailed clinical data about the pre-procedure health of every patient undergoing 
CABG or PTCA in New York over several years allows for more complete risk-
adjustment than has been used in most previous studies. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 The HHI for a given market is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares across all firms 
serving a given market.  Kessler and McClellan (2000) outline the reasons why the use of simple HHI 
measures may lead to biased estimates of the effects of competition in hospital markets. 
4 This number represents a lower bound for the total number of consolidations that occurred in 
New York between 1992 and 1999.  All transactions occurring after 1993 were verified using the annual 
survey of hospital merger activity conducted by Modern Healthcare.  For 1992 and 1993, consolidations 
were identified on the basis of public news reports identified by searches of the LEXIS database. 
5 Ho and Hamilton (2000) suggest that, given the fixed or quasi-fixed nature of hospital prices for 
many services, hospitals could theoretically use lower quality as a means of lowering costs and increasing 
profits following consolidation.  Their empirical analysis finds that consolidations among California 
hospitals in the early 1990s were associated with increased readmission rates for heart attack patients and 
higher rates of early discharge for newborns.  Nonetheless, they find no significant effects on mortality for 
heart attack or stroke patients.  Kessler and McClellan (2000) examine the impact of hospital competition 
on the quality and cost of heart attack patients.  They find that, before 1991, competition was associated 
with higher costs and higher quality of care.  In the early 1990s, however, competition was associated with 
unambiguous welfare effects (i.e., lower costs and higher quality).  Baker and Brown (1999) find that 
increased HMO penetration leads to consolidation among mammography providers.  They also find that 
increased HMO activity is associated with lower costs and longer waiting times for mammography 
appointments, but not with reductions in health outcomes.  
4 
Acquisitions that shift procedure volume from non-acquirers to acquirers are a 
form of “business stealing" (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986).  I find evidence of such 
activity with respect to cardiac care.  In particular, defining the “acquirer” as the hospital 
offering complex cardiac services, I find that consolidations are correlated with an 
increase in the acquirer's share of cardiac procedures originating from the primary market 
of the target.  I consider the welfare implications of this business stealing by 
decomposing its effect on average quality and cost into two components:  simple 
redistribution and volume-related changes in performance.  Simple redistribution captures 
the impact of moving volume between hospitals with different levels of hospital-specific 
quality or cost.  Volume-outcome effects may occur to the extent that consolidations 
increase volumes at some hospitals and decrease them at others.  Such volume changes 
may affect the average quality and cost of care at both acquiring hospitals that gain 
volume and competing facilities that lose it.  Though results differ somewhat for CABG 
and PTCA, hospital consolidation appears to have had little impact on average cost and 
quality of major cardiac procedures in New York.   
 
II.  THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION 
 
Private Incentives for Business Stealing and Increased Volume 
One can imagine several reasons for the pursuit of acquisitions.  These include 
increased volume or market share, higher prices,
 6 and synergies unrelated to quantity.
7  
The first of these is the focus of this analysis. 
                                                           
6 One possible effect of hospital consolidation is an increase in price or price-cost margins 
resulting from greater market concentration (Melnick et al., 1992; Dranove and Shanley, 1995; Keeler,  
5 
A 2003 news article on innovations in cardiac care noted, “For three decades, 
open heart surgery has been the most profitable service at many hospitals” (Kowalczyk, 
2003).  It continues by noting that average margins for CABG procedures have 
traditionally exceeded 40%. The lucrative nature of cardiac procedures has made it 
attractive for hospitals to attempt to steal market share from competitors.  Barro and 
Cutler (2000) speculate that large “downtown” hospitals may buy small “suburban” 
hospitals to increase the share of patients traveling from the suburbs to the downtown 
facility.   
Market transactions are an alternative to vertical integration to increase sales.  In 
health care, however, such market transactions are labeled “kickbacks” and are subject to 
legal and professional sanction.  For example, it is fraudulent for hospitals to sign 
contracts with independent physicians that are construed as involving the “purchase” of 
patient referrals.  Such contracts are viewed as creating potential conflicts of interest for 
physicians who are expected to serve as agents for their patients.  Nevertheless, hospitals 
are typically allowed to employ physicians directly. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Melnick, and Zwanziger, 1999).  Unfortunately, New York collects data at the patient level only on gross 
charges, not on actual prices paid.  As a result, this study is not able to consider the effects of market 
concentration on price.  Given the unique regulatory environment in New York during much of the sample 
period, however, one could argue that these effects were likely small.  Until January 1997, hospital rates for 
inpatients with commercial (i.e., non-HMO and non-government) insurance were administered by a 
statewide pricing formula.  In addition, Medicare inpatient rates were set by the federal government under 
the Prospective Payment System (PPS) adopted in 1983.  As a result of the New York and federal 
regulations, nearly 85% of the inpatient admissions involving CABG or PTCA in New York during 1996 
were covered under some form of price regulation.  This regulatory structure should reduce concerns about 
price-related welfare effects resulting from hospital consolidation, especially in the first half of the sample. 
7 For example, acquisitions may increase the degree of formal or informal communication between 
physicians in the target market and those practicing at acquiring hospital.  In addition, consolidation allows 
each hospital to benefit from the administrative skills (e.g., managerial expertise) found at the other facility.  
Finally, many target hospitals—which are noticeably smaller than acquirers along several dimensions 
(Table 2)—may face financing constraints that reduce their ability to invest in new clinical services.  By 
linking small targets with larger acquirers—who likely have higher internal cash flows and fewer 
borrowing constraints—acquisitions may serve to decrease the financing costs for targets.  The synergies 
described above, however, are not easily captured by the administrative and financial data available at the  
6 
The corporate strategy literature (Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; 
Peteraf, 1993; Capron, 1999) notes that firms integrate to compensate for incomplete 
markets for resources, such as brand names, management expertise, or referrals.  In the 
case of hospital integration, both acquirers and targets may hold critical resources for 
which markets are incomplete.  Through integration, the acquirer might gain access to the 
target’s resource of a close attachment to local patients and physicians; the target might 
gain access to specialized technology, the quality reputation of the acquirer, and 
potentially valuable contracts with managed care payors. 
 
Welfare Implications of Business Stealing 
Acquisitions can change the average quality and cost of care.  With respect to 
either quality or cost, these effects can be decomposed into two parts.  First, business 
stealing results in the movement of patients between hospitals with different levels of 
underlying quality or cost.  For example, patients may move from hospitals that have 
highly-skilled cardiac surgeons to those that have less-skilled surgeons.  I refer to this 
impact of mergers as "simple redistribution". 
Changes in volume at individual hospitals also can affect average quality and 
cost, creating a second channel through which acquisition-related business stealing can 
impact welfare.  Previous studies have identified a negative relationship between annual 
procedure volume—at either the hospital or physician level—and mortality rates for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
hospital level.  As a result, I am unable to provide an empirical test of this theoretical motivation for 
acquisition.  
7 
CABG and PTCA patients.
8  Similar effects may also be present with respect to the 
average cost of care.  Moving volume from one hospital to another may thus improve 
performance at the expanding hospital while decreasing it at the shrinking facility. 
 
III.  CARDIAC PROCEDURES 
 
A Brief Summary of Cardiac Procedures 
The path for a typical cardiac patient through the medical system begins at a 
hospital or physician’s office with a condition that may be either emergent, such as an 
acute myocardial infarction, or chronic, such as ischemic heart disease.  The physician 
decides whether to prescribe a diagnostic cardiac catheterization—which is performed at 
a hospital on either an inpatient or outpatient basis—to look for arterial blockage.  As an 
alternative to catheterization, the physician may prescribe medical treatment of the 
patient’s condition.  For those patients undergoing catheterization, the physician 
recommends one of three broad options—no further surgical treatment, CABG, or PTCA. 
The CABG and PTCA options—together referred to as revascularizations—
involve additional procedures for the patient.  CABG is an invasive surgical procedure 
that involves taking a section of artery, typically from the patient’s leg, and grafting it to 
create a bypass of the blockage in the coronary artery.  It requires the opening of the 
patient’s chest and relies on a heart-lung bypass machine to perform the functions of the 
heart during the grafting process.  In comparison, PTCA involves the threading of a 
balloon device to the point of blockage.  The balloon is inflated to expand the artery and 
                                                           
8 Luft, Bunker, and Enthoven (1979), Showstack et al. (1987) and Hannan et al. (1991) consider 
these relationships for CABG, while Hannan et al. (1997) and Ho (2000) examine them with respect to 
PTCA.  
8 
restore blood flow.  PTCA, therefore, is less traumatic than CABG, as PTCA patients 
avoid the substantial chest incision and arterial reconstruction that are integral parts of the 
CABG procedure.  PTCA patients, however, run the risk of restenosis, or the return of 
blockage to the artery.
9   
 
The Economics of Cardiac Procedures 
Cardiac procedures have high fixed costs in the form of specialized equipment 
and dedicated staff.  Catheterizations and PTCAs are performed in dedicated 
catheterization laboratories.  CABG procedures are performed in operating rooms that—
while sometimes available for other procedures—typically are dedicated to cardiac 
surgery.  Between 1996 and 2000, the State of New York received 51 applications from 
hospitals that intended to build or renovate their catheterization laboratories.
10  The 
average cost for these projects was $2.68 million with a standard deviation of $1.65 
million (New York State Department of Health, 2004).  During the same period, the state 
received seven applications from hospitals that aimed to initiate cardiac surgery 
programs.
11  The mean cost of these programs was $14.05 million with a standard 
deviation of $20.7 million.  These figures do not include the cost of nurses and 
technologists who are typically dedicated to a catheterization lab or a cardiac surgery 
program.  When combined with limitations on hospital investment imposed by many 
states, these high fixed and quasi-fixed costs enable only a portion of hospitals to offer 
CABG and PTCA. 
                                                           
9 In recent years, the problem of restenosis for PTCA patients has decreased due to the 
development of stents, which are small metal inserts that prop open the artery after angioplasty. 
10 To keep projects comparable, this group excludes any applications that included services other 
than cardiac catheterization.  
9 
Cardiac procedures are profitable for hospitals in New York, both on average and 
at the margin.  The average Medicare reimbursement for an admission involving CABG 
in New York was approximately $33,700 in 1997; the analogous figure for PTCA was 
roughly $15,200 (Table 1).
12  The average cost per Medicare admission in 1997 was 
$31,700 for CABG and $13,100 for PTCA.  These figures imply an average profit of 
$2,000 (6%) for CABG and $2,100 (14%) for PTCA.  Though exact revenue data are not 
available for non-Medicare patients, I use the actual distribution of patients across the 
various payor types (i.e., Medicare, commercial, and Medicaid or HMO) in 1997 and 
estimates of the average reimbursement rates for non-Medicare providers to arrive at an 
average profit per case across all payer types in 1997.  These figures are $3,900 for 
CABG (Column 2) and $2,700 for PTCA (Column 3).
13  Multiplying these profit-per-
case figures by the number of patients per hospital receiving CABG and PTCA, 
respectively, illustrates that the average hospital performing CABG and PTCA in New 
York in 1997 generated net revenues of $33.3 million (9.6% of total hospital net revenue) 
and operating profit of $4.7 million (16% of total hospital net income) solely from 
patients receiving either CABG or PTCA. 
Due to the large fixed costs associated with CABG and PTCA, the marginal 
profitability of these procedures substantially exceeds their average profitability.  Later, I 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 This figure and that for catheterization represent the number of applications submitted, not the 
number approved by the state. 
12 The revenue-per-admission figures are based on the fact that New York hospitals received and 
average of $6,164 per case-mix adjusted Medicare case in 1997.  The average case-mix index across all 
Medicare CABG patients in New York was 5.47 in 1997, resulting in the estimated revenue figure of 
$33,700 (≈$6,164 x 5.47) per case.  For PTCA, the average case-mix index was 2.47.  To correct for the 
small number of cases with unrealistically low reported charges, these average case mix figures exclude 
CABG cases with reported charges of less than $5,000 (roughly 1.2% of CABG cases) and PTCA cases 
with reported charges of less than $2,500 (roughly 3.4% of PTCA cases). 
13 A national estimate, reported in 2002, for the average profit for a CABG procedure was $6,800 
per case (Appleby, 2002).  This figure differs from that in this study due to the fact that it is based on more 
recent data from a wider geography than just New York State.  
10 
estimate the marginal cost for an admission involving CABG in 1997 to be 
approximately $26,700, implying a marginal profit of $6,200.  For PTCA, the estimated 
marginal cost was $9,800 and marginal profit was $4,900.
14  Most hospitals thus are in a 
position of seeking to expand their volume of cardiac procedures. 
 
IV.  ACQUISITIONS IN NEW YORK STATE, 1992-1999 
 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this study, a “consolidation” is defined as any transaction that 
involves delegating the key decision-making rights of two or more hospitals to a single 
board.  The universe of consolidations thus includes full asset mergers, holding 
companies involving substantially all of the operations of multiple hospitals, and any 
other “active parent” relationships.  This definition of consolidation excludes less-formal 
relationships such as joint marketing agreements for particular services (e.g., cardiac 
care, oncology) and academic affiliations.  Consolidations can be classified further as 
either “acquisitions” or “mergers” depending on the characteristics of the hospitals 
involved.  An acquisition joins two or more parties that are asymmetric with respect to 
size or services offered.  Alternatively, mergers bring together parties that are roughly 
similar with respect to size and services. 
This paper focuses on acquisitions and defines acquirers and targets by their 
cardiac service offerings.  Specifically, an acquirer is a hospital that offers CABG and 
                                                           
14 The marginal cost estimates are based on the estimated effect of ln[annual CABG (PTCA) 
admissions] for hospital h on average cost per CABG (PTCA) admission at hospital h (see Equation (3)).  
The marginal cost estimates are calculated by dividing the growth in total costs due to a 1% increase in 
volume by the absolute magnitude of the 1% volume increment.  
11 
PTCA and was involved in an acquisition between 1992 and 1999.
15  A target is a 
hospital that was involved in an acquisition between 1992 and 1999 and did not offer 
CABG or PTCA prior to consolidation.  Acquisitions integrate hospitals that possess 
fundamentally different capabilities with respect to cardiac procedures and, as a result, do 
not necessarily result in a reduction in the number of firms providing these services in a 
given market.  In fact, during the time period studied, none of the CABG or PTCA 
programs in New York State were closed.
16 
Based on the definitions above, over 60% of the consolidations in New York 
between 1992 and 1999—28 out of 45
17—were acquisitions (Figure 1).  In six of the 17 
mergers, both hospitals offered CABG and PTCA, and, in the remaining 11, none of the 
parties offered CABG or PTCA prior to merger.  These two types of mergers are referred 
to as “big-big” and “small-small”, respectively, in Figure 1. 
 
Universe of Transactions 
The universe of transactions for this study includes the 28 acquisitions involving 
New York hospitals between 1992 and 1999.  These 28 transactions corresponded to the 
acquisition of 35 target hospitals by 16 acquirers.  The year of a given transaction is 
defined as the one in which it legally closed.  In cases where the date of closure is not 
                                                           
15 This range of dates reflects the fact that minimal acquisition activity occurred in New York prior 
to 1992.   
16 The CABG program at one facility in a multi-hospital system was moved to a different hospital 
in that system in 1993.  Nonetheless, the number of statewide CABG programs was not affected by this 
transfer. 
17 This number represents a lower bound for the total number of consolidations that occurred in 
New York between 1992 and 1999.  All transactions occurring after 1993 were verified using the annual 
survey of hospital merger activity conducted by Modern Healthcare.  For 1992 and 1993, consolidations 
were identified on the basis of public news reports identified by searches of the LEXIS database.  
12 
available, the year in which both hospital boards approved the consolidation is used as 
the year of the transaction.
18 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for 1992—the first year of discharge data 
used in this study—for the hospitals in the sample of acquisitions.  On average, acquirers 
were more than twice as large as targets in terms of inpatient beds and hospital days and 
at least three times as large in terms of net revenue and operating expenses.  With respect 
to cardiac procedures, the average acquirer performed nearly 650 CABG and 470 PTCA 
procedures in 1992.   
 
Primary Hospital Markets 
Defining hospital markets is an issue that has received significant attention in the 
literature (see Gresenz, Rogowski, and Escarce (2004) for a recent discussion).  Some 
studies use fixed radii around a hospital (e.g., Shen, 2003), while others have defined 
markets based on variable radii around a hospital to capture a fixed percentage of its 
admissions (e.g., Phibbs and Robinson, 1993).  Defining markets based on observed 
admissions may be subject to concerns of endogeneity with respect to variables of 
interest, such as prices, quality, or market volume (Kessler and McClellan, 2000).   
I use a variant of the variable-radii approach to define the primary markets of each 
target hospital in my sample.  The primary market of a target includes any zip codes that 
accounted for at least five percent of a hospital’s inpatient admissions in the base year of 
                                                           
18 The dates of transactions were determined using the following sources: searches of the 
LEXIS/NEXIS database using the names of potential acquirers; the annual survey of hospital consolidation 
activity in the United States conducted by Modern Healthcare for each year after and including 1994; the 
Greater New York Hospital Association’s annual surveys of health care systems in New York for each year 
after and including 1993; and author’s correspondence with hospital executives.  
13 
the study (i.e., 1992).
19  I use this simple approach to market definition because I am 
identifying the impact of mergers based on longitudinal analysis of an acquirer’s market 
share within a given target market.  The goal of my analysis is to identify an area that 
represents the “historic” market for a target hospital and ask how the share of cardiac 
cases traveling to the acquirer from that market changes after an acquisition.   
 
V.  DATA 
 
A critical reason for using New York as the setting for this study is the high 
quality of data—both administrative and clinical—available for cardiac patients.  The 
Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System (SPARCS) database provides 
discharge-level records on every inpatient hospital case in the state.
20  This database 
includes detailed information about the patient (e.g., age, race, sex, insurance status, zip 
code of residence), providers (e.g., hospital and physician identifiers), diagnoses, and 
procedures performed.  In 2000, this database included over 2.3 million discharges, the 
smallest total for any of the nine years—1992 through 2000—analyzed in this study. 
The information from SPARCS is supplemented by discharge-level data for 
CABG patients from New York's Cardiac Surgery Reporting System (CSRS) and for 
PTCA patients from the state's Coronary Angioplasty Reporting System (CARS).  These 
data provide additional clinical detail on each patient undergoing revascularization 
                                                           
 
19 To provide for a slightly larger market area, I repeat the base regressions using markets that 
include any zip code that accounted for at least three percent of a hospital’s inpatient admissions in 1992.  
The results on share redistribution reported later in the paper are robust to this change in market definition.  
20 The SPARCS data were obtained following approval from the Data Protection Review Board of 
the New York State Department of Health.  For the multivariate analysis later in the paper, I exclude those 
records that did not receive a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) code.  In 1992, 84,581 admissions (3.2% of  
14 
between 1991 and 1996 for CABG and 1993 and 1995 for PTCA.  The annual number of 
CABG procedures in the CSRS data ranges from a low of 14,944 in 1991 to a high of 
20,078 in 1996;
21 for PTCA, these figures vary from 16,804 in 1993 to 21,707 in 1995. 
The cost regressions and welfare calculations appearing later in this paper draw 
upon data from Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) cost reports.  These data 
provide cost-to-charge ratios for each hospital performing CABG or PTCA in New York 
for each year between 1992 and 1998. 
 
VI.  RESULTS 
 
Business Stealing 
  To test for business stealing, I determine whether acquisitions are associated with 
changes in the shares of acquirers serving the primary markets of target hospitals.  The 
identification of acquisition-related changes in market share comes from the staggered 
timing of individual transactions.  I estimate the following specification using data from 
all zip codes that are within the primary market of at least one target hospital: 
 
ACQ_SHAREit = αi + γ3t + δkDit + βZit + εit               (1) 
 
ACQ_SHAREit represents the market share of the relevant acquirer for zip code i in year t.  
If zip code i is in the primary market of multiple target hospitals, ACQ_SHAREit is the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
total) did not have a DRG; in 1993, this figure was 117,135 (4.6%).  After 1993, all records in the SPARCS 
data received a DRG.  
15 
combined share of all acquirers for that zip code.
22  The above specification is estimated 
separately for CABG and PTCA. 
The key independent variables are included in Dit, the vector of indicators for 
“year relative to acquisition.”   Each of the individual indicators, referred to as 
k
it d , takes 
a value of one if zip code i is in the primary market of a target hospital that: 1) was 
acquired between 1992 and 1999 and 2) is k years away from the date of acquisition in 
year t.
23  Because I am interested in identifying changes in primary markets after 
consolidation, I test whether each 
k
it d  coefficient is significantly different from that for 
the year of acquisition, 
0
it d , or the year immediately preceding acquisition, 
1 −
it d .
24  The 
pre-transaction dummy variables serve to distinguish acquisition-related changes from 
the simple continuation of existing trends that may be unrelated to consolidation.   
Zip-code fixed effects, αi, are included to control for time-invariant characteristics 
of given areas that might affect the market share of specific providers.  The vector Zit 
includes additional demographic controls.  These include Medicaid, HMO, and female 
patients, respectively, as a percentage of patients receiving a particular cardiac procedure 
in a given zip code.  These variables control for the possibility that certain providers may 
be more likely to target particular socioeconomic, payor, or gender categories.  In 
addition, Zit includes the percentage of patients from a given zip code in each of several 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 The CSRS data includes information only for “isolated” CABG procedures.  A CABG is 
“isolated” when it occurs on a patient who does not receive any other major heart surgery (e.g., valve or 
other heart procedures) during the same admission (New York State Department of Health, 1998). 
22 Seventy-nine percent of the zip codes that are in the primary market of at least one target are in 
the primary market of only one target, 20% are in the primary market of two targets, and 1% are in the 
primary market of three targets. 
23 The index k is negative for years prior to merger and assumes the following values: <-4, -3,-2,-
1, 0, 1, 2, 3, and >4.  
16 
age categories
25.  These categories allow for the possibility of a non-linear relationship 
between patient age and the market shares of particular types of hospitals. 
Fixed effects for calendar time, γ3t, are included to control for changes in the 
average share of acquirers over time.  For example, if, on average, acquirers increased 
their quality more than other hospitals during the period studied, one would not be 
surprised to see their shares growing in target areas over time even in the absence of 
acquisitions.  Including single-year fixed effects concurrently with fixed effects for zip 
code and year-relative-to-acquisition, however, creates problems with respect to 
identification.  In fact, the identification in such a model would come only from those zip 
codes that are in the primary market of more than one hospital and the “collection 
points”—four or more years before or after acquisition—among the year-relative-to-
acquisition indicators.  As an alternative to fixed effects for each year, I use indicators for 
three-year periods—1992 to 1994, 1995 to 1997, and 1998 to 2000—to capture the 
impact of calendar time on the share to acquirers.  
Table 3 shows that acquisitions increase the CABG and PTCA market shares of 
acquiring hospitals in primary markets of their targets.  Column 1 illustrates that the 
CABG share to acquirers increases by a total of 5.0 percentage points from Year 0 to 
Year 3.  The magnitude of this increase—which is calculated by subtracting the value of 
the Year 0 coefficient from the Year 3 coefficient [0.027-(-0.023)]—is 18% of the 
weighted average share to acquirers prior to acquisition (27.6%) and is significant at the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 Comparisons with both the year of acquisition and the year before acquisition are used because 
the official merger date is measured by the year in which the transaction closes.  Changes in market share, 
however, may begin after the deal is announced but before it closes. 
25 The age categories include: less than 50, 50-59, 60-64, 65-74, 75-84, and greater than or equal 
to 85.  
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1% level.
26  The share increase for four or more years after acquisition is similar in 
magnitude at 4.8 percentage points and is significant at the 5% level.  Though not 
significant at conventional levels, the share gains for the first and second years following 
acquisition do suggest an increasing trend.  The results for PTCA (Column 2) are similar 
to those for CABG and suggest an increase of 6.0 percentage points (24% relative to the 
weighted average share in the sample) by Year 3 and 6.3 percentage points for Year 4 
and beyond.
27  Figure 2 presents these results graphically, normalizing acquirer share to 
zero in Year 0. 
As mentioned above, for many acquisitions, I was only able to confirm the year in 
which the transaction was completed rather than the year in which it was announced.  
Nevertheless, it is possible that referral patterns may begin to change after a merger is 
announced but before it closes.  I thus test the significance of share changes relative to 
Year -1 rather than Year 0.  Measuring changes in this manner for CABG suggest slightly 
larger and statistically significant changes for Year 3 and Year 4 and beyond.  In 
addition, it shows that the change by Year 2 is also significant at the 5% level.  For 
PTCA, the changes for Year 3 and beyond are slightly smaller in magnitude, though still 
significant at conventional levels.     
A few features of these results merit particular attention.  First, despite the 
inclusion of zip-code-level fixed effects, the Durbin-Watson statistics for the regressions 
in Table 3 suggest that some correction for correlation in the error terms may be required.  
                                                           
26 This weighted-average share is calculated using all zip-year observations prior to the year of the 
acquisition affecting a given zip code.  In cases where a zip code is in the primary market of two or more 
hospitals, this figure is calculated based on the date of the first acquisition affecting that area. 
27 The dependent variable in the basic specification is limited to values between zero and one.  To 
address the impact of this restriction, I re-estimate the regressions using the logistic transformation of the 
acquirer’s market share in a given zip code.  That is, the dependent variable in these regressions becomes  
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To address this issue, the standard errors in all models are clustered by target market to 
address any possible lack of independence in the error terms (i.e., remaining after the zip-
code fixed effects) for zip codes within the same target market.
28   
A second potential critique of these results is that the occurrence of acquisitions 
may be endogenous.  For example, acquirers may use these transactions to solidify their 
presence in markets where they are already gaining share.  In such a case, a post-
acquisition increase in share in a target market may simply represent the continuation of 
pre-acquisition trend.  Nevertheless, the coefficients on the pre-acquisition indicators 
reveal that there is no significant pre-acquisition trend in market share and, therefore, 
reduce concerns about the effects of such endogeneity. 
A third potential critique of these results is that they may be influenced by the 
unbalanced panel of observations.  This might be the case if certain acquisitions are 
included in the sample for their post-acquisition years, but are not included in their pre-
acquisition years and vice-versa.  For example, because the data range from 1992 to 
2000, a transaction that occurred in 1993 will not have observations for two, three, and 
four or more years prior to acquisition.  Similarly, a transaction occurring in 1998 will 
not have observations for three or four or more years after acquisition.  While the data 
include at least one year of post-acquisition observations for 28 transactions and two 
                                                                                                                                                                             
LTSHAREit=ln(ACQ_SHAREit/(1-ACQ_SHAREit)).  The estimates are qualitatively similar to those in the 
basic specification. 
28 I also estimate these models with the assumption of an AR(1) error structure within zip codes 
and heteroskedasticity across zip codes.  The results of this AR(1) estimation are qualitatively similar to 
those in Table 4, though there is some evidence of a decline in market share to acquirers prior to 
acquisition.  The AR(1) model, however,  does not account for potential correlation across zip codes within 
a given target market, as is the case with the clustered standard errors reported in Table 3.  The clustered 
models, while not efficient, are robust to any type of within-group correlation.  Given the support for the 
use of clustering over parametric assumptions in similar situations (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 
2004), I use the results with standard errors clustered by target area for this analysis.  
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years for 23, there are three (four-plus) years of observations for only 19 (16) 
acquisitions. 
To address the impact of the unbalanced panel, I re-estimate (1) on a sample that 
includes only those zip codes with data in each period from Year –2 to Year 2.  The 
results of these regressions appear in Columns 1 (CABG) and 3 (PTCA) of Table 4.  To 
ensure balance, these regressions include only those zip codes that were in the primary 
market of a single acquisition between 1992 and 1999.  The resulting panels include 
observations from roughly 18% of the zip codes in the unbalanced CABG (PTCA) 
regression in Table 3.   
The regressions provide strong support for the hypothesis of acquisition-related 
increases in the average share of procedures going to acquirers.  Relative to Year 0, 
CABG share increases by roughly 7.4 percentage points (46% relative to the 16.1% 
weighted average share for the balanced sample prior to acquisition) by Year 2 (Column 
1).  Similarly, PTCA share rises by 13.9 percentage points (Column 3).  As in the 
unbalanced panel, there is no significant pre-acquisition trend in share to acquirers.  The 
results in Columns 2 and 4 extend the balanced panel to three years following acquisition 
and illustrate that the increase in market share continues beyond Year 2.  The three-year 
increase for CABG (PTCA) is greater than 8.7 (19.2) percentage points.  The dashed 
lines in Figure 2 show these results graphically.  
The balanced panels that extend to three years after acquisition show some 
evidence of share increases prior to the year of acquisition, particularly for PTCA.  
Nevertheless, the growth in share from Year 0 to Year 2 is over twice the magnitude of  
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the growth from Year -2 to Year 0.  As noted above all of the balanced-panel results must 
be qualified by the restricted samples on which they are estimated.   
 
VII.  IMPLICATIONS FOR QUALITY AND COST 
 
I next consider the effect of acquisitions on the quality and cost of care.  A 
common measure of the quality of CABG and PTCA procedures is the risk-adjusted 
mortality rate (RAMR).  Previous studies have used administrative covariates, such as 
age, race, gender, and the number of comorbidities as the basis for the risk-adjustment of 
outcomes (Ho and Hamilton, 2000).  New York’s CSRS and CARS data provide 
additional clinical covariates for each patient.  This information, such as the patient’s 
ejection fraction and whether he or she has a history of diabetes or myocardial infarction, 
allows for better risk-adjustment.  New York State uses this CABG and PTCA data to 
create risk-adjusted mortality rankings for individual physicians and hospitals in the 
entire state.  These rankings have been released in annual public reports (e.g., New York 
State Department of Health, 1998) each year since 1993 (for CABG) and 1995 (for 
PTCA). 
To determine the effect of acquisitions on total mortality, I estimate the following 
specification: 
 
iht iht 1 t , h d t h iht ε M φ ) x ln( β γ δ MORT + + + + = −     (2) 
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MORTiht is an indicator that assumes a value of one if patient i died during his or her stay 
in hospital h following a procedure in year t.  xh,t-1 is the volume of relevant procedures—
either CABG or PTCA—performed at hospital h in year t.  I use the lagged value of 
annual volume to reduce the impact of possible endogeneity associated with using 
volume in the current year.  The semi-logarithmic form chosen for (2) is common in the 
volume-outcome literature (Luft, Hunt, and Maerki, 1987; Farley and Ozminkowski, 
1992).
29  δh is a vector of hospital fixed effects, γt is a vector of fixed effects for year, and 
Miht is a vector of demographic and clinical controls for each patient.  I estimate (2) 
separately for CABG and PTCA.  A list of the controls included in each equation appears 
in the Appendix.
30 
  A specification analogous to (2) is used to estimate the risk-adjusted cost of 
CABG and PTCA cases.  The form of this equation is: 
 
iht iht 1 t , h c t h iht ε R φ ) x ln( β γ µ COST + + + + = −      (3) 
 
Similar to (2), the above equation includes fixed effects for hospital (µh) and year (γt) as 
well as a vector, Riht, which contains both a linear and quadratic control for patient age.  
COSTiht represents the estimated cost of patient i’s entire admission, regardless of 
whether that patient received procedures other than CABG or PTCA.  This variable is 
                                                           
 
29  To test the fit of the semi-logarithmic form for the mortality regression, I re-estiamted this 
equation using: 1) only a linear volume term and 2) linear and quadratic volume terms.  The adjusted R
2 
were identical to three digits in all three specifications.  Similar results were obtained for various forms of 
the PTCA mortality model.  Given the use of the semi-logarithmic form in prior studies—as well as the 
belief that volume-outcome effects taper at higher volumes—I rely on the semi-logarithmic sepcficiation 
for this analysis. 
30 Because length of stay may be an endogenous determinant of mortality, it is not included in the 
regressions presented in this paper.  Nevertheless, including length of stay does not have a material effect 
on either the coefficient on lagged volume or the relative values of the hospital-specific intercepts.  
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estimated because New York provides data only for gross charges—not actual cost or 
prices paid—at the level of the individual patient.  To estimate the cost per patient 
admission, I calculate the cost-to-charge ratio for each hospital-year using data from the 
Medicare PPS Cost Reports.  For a given hospital, the cost-to-charge ratio is total 
operating expense divided by gross patient revenues.  The average value of this ratio 
across the nine acquirers in the sample—77.1%—is roughly similar to the average value 
of 72.9% for targets (Table 2).  
This single ratio does not capture the heterogeneity in cost-to-charge ratios across 
various clinical departments within a given hospital (e.g., the cost-to-charge ratios for 
cardiac care may be quite different from those for general medical care).  To the extent 
that each hospital’s composition of low-margin and high-margin services differs, the use 
of a single cost-to-charge ratio for each facility may hinder comparison of cardiac costs 
across facilities.  Limiting this analysis only to hospitals that provide CABG and PTCA 
likely provides greater homogeneity in case mix across sample hospitals than that found 
in the entire cross section of New York facilities.  Nevertheless, the remaining 
heterogeneity across sample hospitals cannot be easily measured or controlled for using 
the data available for this study. 
For several reasons, the mortality and cost regressions are run on patient 
populations that overlap significantly, but are not identical.  First, the CSRS and CARS 
data are not available for the same years as the SPARCS data.
31  In addition, a small 
                                                           
31 The CABG mortality results are based on CSRS data for all cases from 1992 to 1996 (with 1991 
used to generate lagged volumes) and the PTCA regressions include data for 1994 and 1995 (with 1993 
data used to generate lagged volumes).  These were the only years of data available as of the date this study 
was initiated.  The cost regressions—which rely on the patient-level charge information found in SPARCS 
but not in the CSRS and CARS database—include CABG and PTCA patients for the six-year period from 
1993 to 1998 (with 1992 used to generate lagged volumes).  Given differences in encryption 
methodologies, the CSRS, CARS, and SPARCS data could not be linked for this study, so clinical  
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percentage of cases in the SPARCS data have unrealistically low reported charges; I 
exclude CABG cases with reported charges of less than $5,000 (roughly 1.2% of CABG 
cases) and PTCA cases with reported charges of less than $2,500 (roughly 3.4% of PTCA 
cases) from the cost regressions.  These cases may or may not be included in the CSRS 
and CARS data, and, hence, in the mortality regressions.  
Table 5 reports the volume-outcome effects with respect to both mortality and 
cost.  For CABG, a 10% increase in a hospital’s lagged CABG volume is correlated with 
a 0.09 percentage point decrease in its risk-adjusted mortality rate.  This 0.09 percentage-
point decrease represents a change of 3.3% relative to the statewide mortality rate for 
CABG of 2.66%.
32  In contrast, the PTCA regressions suggest a positive, but 
insignificant, relationship between lagged hospital volume and mortality.  The PTCA 
results must be qualified, however, as they are based on only two years of data.  Further, 
mortality is less common for PTCA than for CABG, making outcomes noisier for the 
former procedure.  The welfare calculations later in this section assume no volume-
related quality effects for PTCA.  This assumption is conservative in light of other studies 
that have found a volume-outcome relationship for PTCA that is in the same direction as 
that for CABG (Hannan et al., 1997; Ho, 2000).  
The cost regressions find that costs fall as volume increases.  These effects are 
small, but highly significant, for both CABG and PTCA.  For CABG, a 10% increase in 
volume leads to a $230 decrease in the average cost per case (0.8% relative to the average 
of $28,000 per case across all years and zip codes in the sample).  For PTCA, a similar 
                                                                                                                                                                             
covariates could not be incorporated into the cost regressions.  As a result, the risk-adjustment for cost is 
more limited than that for mortality. 
32 Represents the statewide, in-hospital mortality rate for CABG in New York for the period from 
1991 to 1996.  
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increase in volume leads to a $220 decrease in cost (1.9% relative to the average of 
$11,800 per case across all years and zip codes). 
The movement of market share between hospitals can affect total welfare via two 
channels: simple redistribution and volume-outcome effects.  Table 6 summarizes the 
effects on cost and quality for CABG and PTCA across all of the acquisitions in this 
study.  Unless otherwise noted, these effects are based on changes that occur by Year 3.  
To determine the values in the "Simple Redistribution" section of the table, I re-estimate 
(1) using the volume-weighted, hospital-specific intercepts for mortality (δh) and cost 
(µh) from (2) and (3), respectively, as the dependent variable.  For the most part, share 
redistribution has no significant effect on either CABG mortality or cost.  The one 
exception is the reduction in mortality of 3.5 deaths in the two-year balanced panel, 
though this result is based on data from only 36 zip codes. 
To measure volume-outcome effects, I draw upon the market share results from 
Table 3.  For the average target market in the year 2000, this share increase translated 
into approximately seven additional CABG cases per year per target acquired.  Given the 
semi-logarithmic form of the volume-outcome relationships, the net effect of this 
movement depends on the total number of patients at each type of hospital prior to an 
acquisition.  In 2000, hospitals that were acquirers during the study period had an average 
of 983 CABG cases.  To simplify the calculations, I divide the universe of hospitals that 
"lost" volume into two groups:  hospitals that made acquisitions in other markets but not 
in the market in question (i.e., non-local acquirers) and hospitals that did not make any 
acquisitions (i.e., non-acquirers).  The former hospitals performed an average of 825 
CABG procedures in 2000, while the latter performed 614.  Regardless of whether the  
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full sample or balanced panels are used, the volume-outcome effects suggest small 
declines in mortality and cost at acquirers that are almost entirely offset by increases at 
non-local acquirers and non-acquirers.  The aggregate impact of these volume-outcome 
effects is, therefore, very small.   
These small overall volume-outcome effects are not unexpected given the 
magnitude of cases moving between hospitals relative to the overall size of their cardiac 
programs.  For example, the average acquirer adds roughly seven CABG procedures per 
year per acquisition from seven competing facilities, while each non-acquirer loses one 
procedure per year per acquisition.  Given the total volume of CABG procedures being 
performed by the hospitals in this sample (i.e., 600 to 1000), it is quite likely that this 
relatively small movement of volume occurs near the “flat” of the volume-outcome 
curve.  While these volume-outcome effects are not substantial with respect to mature 
procedures, such as CABG, such effects could be more meaningful for procedures that 
are early in their lifecycle or for procedures where acquirers and non-acquirers have 
dramatically different initial volumes of activity.  Repeating this methodology on 
technologies that are earlier in their life cycle represents an area for future investigation. 
The bottom half of Table 6 presents analogous welfare calculations for PTCA.  
These figures are more sensitive to the assumptions of the analysis than is the case for 
CABG.  For example, the unbalanced panel suggests an increase in mortality of roughly 
four deaths per year in New York due to the redistribution of patients to hospitals with 
relatively weaker PTCA programs.  The balanced panel results, however, show wide-
ranging outcomes.  The two-year balanced panel shows trivial welfare improvement (due  
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to slightly reduced costs), while the three-year balanced panel reveals significant 
increases in mortality offset by decreases in cost, both due primarily to redistribution.
33   
The less-consistent welfare implications for PTCA relative to CABG may be due 
to several factors.   First, much of the effect is driven by simple redistribution and, as 
suggested by the change from the unbalanced to balanced panels, such patterns may 
depend substantially on the markets selected for analysis.  In addition, these results may 
be affected by the limited mortality data available for PTCA.  With only two years of 
observations, the hospital-specific coefficients used in the redistribution calculation are 
quite noisy.  Finally, given the low average mortality rate for PTCA relative to CABG, 
one might question whether an outcome measure other than mortality might yield a more 
precise comparison of quality across hospitals. 
  A few caveats concerning these welfare calculations are worth noting.  First, 
while the calculations described above capture the impact of business stealing, they do 
not include the effect of potential changes in the total market quantity of procedures.  In a 
Cournot model, reductions in market quantity are associated with deadweight loss.  
Alternatively, one could imagine that volume-outcome effects, by changing the 
profitability of cardiac procedures for particular hospitals, could create incentives to 
increase or decrease volume.  In the current setting, however, simply knowing whether 
the total volume of procedures increases or decreases does not allow for a definitive 
assessment of welfare effects.  Specifically, the costs and benefits associated with the 
marginal procedure depend on the clinical condition of the patient receiving (or not 
                                                           
 
33 One could use an analysis of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) to determine whether the 
value of the life years lost in some models due to redistribution of PTCA patients outweighs the associated 
cost savings.  Such calculations, however, require assumptions about the expected survival of those patients 
whose mortality was "accelerated" due to the redistribution and are beyond the scope of this paper.  
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receiving) that treatment as well as the risk-adjusted outcome.  These effects cannot be 
measured using the CSRS and CARS data as they do not include information on patients 
who were candidates for CABG or PTCA but did not receive either procedure.  The 
welfare effect calculated in this paper thus should be viewed as an incremental effect 
beyond any impact that is due to the changes in the overall volume of cardiac procedures. 
Second, this study examines only cardiac procedures and does not consider the 
effects of acquisitions on quality or cost in other clinical areas.  Nevertheless, the 
methodology of this study could be applied to other types of complex treatment where 
volume-outcome effects may be present and a complementary relationship may exist 
between acquirers and targets. 
Third, the welfare implications provided by this study rely on in-hospital 
mortality as an outcome measure.  Ideally one would also like to examine other measures 
of quality, such as mortality or readmission within some fixed period after hospital 
discharge (e.g., 30 days or six months) or other measures of patient health status 
following a procedure.  Such information, however, is not available in these data.  
Finally, events other than acquisitions were occurring in New York during this 
period and may have affected the distribution of CABG and PTCA volume across 
hospitals.  Of particular note is the release of hospital report cards for these procedures.  
Some studies have suggested that these report cards were associated with the shift of 
CABG volume from low-performing to high-performing hospitals (Mukamel and 
Mushlin, 1998; Cutler, Huckman, and Landrum, 2004).  Others suggest that the 
institution of CABG report cards encouraged providers to operate on less severe patients 
(Dranove et al., 2003).  To the extent that poor performing hospitals were more likely to  
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engage in such risk selection, volume may have been redistributed between low and high 
performers.  While it is possible that the results of this study could be confounded with 
the impact of report cards, I note the significant redistribution of CABG patients in the 
full sample (Table 3, Column 1) is not associated with redistribution effects on mortality 
(Table 6, Column 1).  
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper views hospital acquisitions as transactions that bring together 
complements—not simply substitutes—in production.  When consolidation is viewed 
from this vertical perspective, its welfare effects must be assessed not solely by using 
standard relationships between measures of market concentration and market outcomes, 
but rather based on empirical analysis of the redistribution of volume between firms.  
Based on the sample of transactions from New York, I find that acquirers steal business 
within target markets.  Though the welfare implications are somewhat more precise for 
CABG than for PTCA patients, hospital consolidation appears to have had relatively little 
impact on average cost and quality of major cardiac procedures in New York. 
This study suggests that an overall assessment of the implications of hospital 
consolidation should consider the fact that these transactions do not simply reduce the 
number of firms providing substitute products.  Rather, with respect to certain services, 
they alter the allocation of customers across firms with differentiated levels of quality and 
cost.  Acknowledging the complementary nature of the hospitals involved in many  
29 
acquisitions makes for a more complete assessment of consolidation’s impact on the 
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Note:  A hospital is considered “big” if it offers CABG and PTCA procedures and “small” if it does not offer these procedures.  Transactions 
involving the acquisition of multiple target facilities are counted as single consolidations. 
 
Sources:  LEXIS-NEXIS search of local newspapers; Modern Healthcare; author correspondence with hospital executives. 
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CABG (Unbalanced) PTCA (Unbalanced) CABG (3-Year Balanced) PTCA (3-Year Balanced)
 
Note: Values for the unbalanced panels are obtained by subtracting the Year 0 coefficient from the relevant "year relative to merger" coefficient from Table 3, 
Columns 1 and 2 . 
 
Source: SPARCS Database, 1992-1998.  
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Medicare All Cases Medicare All Cases All Cases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Revenue/Case* 33,700 $   32,900 $           15,200 $   14,700 $          
Average Cost/Case 31,700      29,000              13,100      12,000             
Average Profit/Case 2,000        3,900                2,100        2,700               
Marginal Cost/Case** 26,700              9,800               
Marginal Profit/Case 6,200                4,900               
Average Cases/Hospital 654 806
Average Revenue Per Hospital 21,505,291 $    11,843,745 $    33,349,036 $    




Medicare revenue/case based on the assumption of $6,164 per case mix adjusted admission.  "All Cases" revenue 
figures assume that revenue/case is 10% greater for Commercial patients and 20% less for HMO and Medicaid 
patients (relative to Medicare).  Further, the "All Cases" revenue assumes a payor mix similar to that in New York 
during 1997.  For CABG this mix is 50% Medicare, 25% commercial, and 25% Medicaid or HMO; for PTCA, this mix is 
40% Medicare, 30% commercial, and 30% Medicaid or HMO.
The marginal cost figures are based on the estimated effect of ln[annual CABG (PTCA) admissions] for hospital h on 
average cost per CABG (PTCA) admission at hospital h (see Equation (3)).  The marginal cost estimates are 
calculated by dividing the growth in total costs due to a 1% increase in volume by the absolute magnitude of the 1% 
volume increment.
Panel B: Total Revenue and Profit from CABG and PTCA Procedures
Panel A: Per-Case Revenue and Profit from CABG and PTCA Procedures 
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Inpatient Beds 16 856              318            31 421              158            ***
Inpatient Days 16 269,759       96,635       31 125,084       55,111       ***
Financial Data ($000s Unless Otherwise Specified)
Hospital Charges 16 521,000 $    253,000 $ 31 173,000 $    90,300 $    ***
Net Revenue (Hospital Charges Less Discounts) 16 363,000       175,000     31 121,000       64,800       ***
Operating Expenses 16 403,000       204,000     31 126,000       68,700       ***
Net Income Margin 16 -0.9% 3.6% 31 0.9% 3.6% *
Cost-to-Charge Ratio (Operating Expenses/Total Charges) 16 77.1% 9.9% 31 72.9% 8.9%
Patients Receiving
CABG 15 649              361           




***,**, and * denote that acquirer and target means are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, repsectively.  Acquirer 
and target data are reported by facility (rather than by firm) in cases where a each facility reports data separately to Medicare.  One 
acquirer provided PTCA but not CABG.
Medicare PPS Cost Reports, 1992; New York State Department of Health, Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System 
(SPARCS), 1992. 
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Primary Market of Target x
4+ Years Pre-Acquisition -0.035 -0.002
(0.028) (0.043)
3 Years Pre-Acquisition -0.032 -0.025
(0.020) (0.029)
2 Years Pre-Acquisition -0.017
¥¥ -0.030
(0.015) (0.025)
1 Year Pre-Acquisition -0.038 -0.043
(0.016) (0.021)
Year of Acquisition -0.023 -0.057
(0.013) (0.017)
1 Year Post-Acquisition -0.015 -0.050
(0.016) (0.017)
2 Years Post-Acquisition -0.003
¥¥ -0.029
(0.014) (0.018)



















Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.64 1.50
Female (As Percentage of CABG 
Cases)
Market Share to Acquirer
HMO (As Percentage of CABG Cases)
Medicaid (As Percentage of CABG 
Cases)
Average Value of Dependent Variable 
Prior to First Acquisition
 
***,**,*  Coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
###,##,#  Coefficient is statistically significantly different from the "Year of Acquisition" coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .         
¥¥¥,¥¥,¥  Coefficient is statistically significantly different from the "1 Year Pre-Acquisition" coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .         
Note:  Robust standard errors, clustered by target market, are in parentheses.  Each regression includes the following variables which 
do not appear in this table:  a constant term; 3-year fixed effects; zip-code fixed effects; and indicators for several age categories 
(i.e., less than 50, 50-59, 60-64, 65-74, 75-84, and greater than 84).  The data for each zip-code observation is weighted by the 
number of cases from that zip code.  For ease of presentation, the indicators of significant differences from zero (***,**,*) are not 
presented for any of the "year relative to acquisition" variables.         
39 














(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Market of Target x
2 Years Pre-Acquisition 0.00648 -0.05340
*** 0.00622 -0.06650
(0.0326) (0.0161) (0.0306) (0.0448)
1 Year Pre-Acquisition 0.01359 -0.04743 0.01347 -0.05097
***
(0.0252) (0.0295) (0.0118) (0.0170)
Year of Acquisition
1 Year Post-Acquisition 0.00381 0.01022 0.03140 0.07234
***,¥¥¥
(0.0182) (0.0272) (0.0210) (0.0272)





(0.0249) (0.0259) (0.0405) (0.0441)




0.03086 0.06908 0.02116 -0.06516
(0.0639) (0.1142) (0.0888) (0.0751)
-0.11301 0.00565 -0.22401 -0.19988
(0.1513) (0.1883) (0.1803) (0.2508)
-0.01071 0.05242 -0.05868 -0.59240 *
(0.2231) (0.1791) (0.2007) (0.3119)
0.161 0.184 0.165 0.236
N 36 18 35 17
NT 180 108 175 102
Adjusted R




Coefficient is statistically signficantly different from the "1 Year Pre-Acquisition" coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors, clustered by target market, are in parentheses.  Each regression includes the following 
variables which do not appear in this table:  a constant term; 3-year fixed effects; zip-code fixed effects; and indicators 
for several age categories (i.e., less than 50, 50-59, 60-64, 65-74, 75-84, and greater than 84).  The data for each zip-
code observation is weighted by the number of cases from that zip code.
Average Value of Dependent 
Variable Prior to First Acquisition
Female (As Percentage of CABG 
Cases)
HMO (As Percentage of CABG 
Cases)
Medicaid (As Percentage of CABG 
Cases)
Coefficient is statistically signficantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Lagged Annual CABG Cases at Facility) -0.0093 ** -2,297 ***
(0.0047) (577.8)     
ln(Lagged Annual PTCA Cases at Facility) 0.0096 -2,200 ***
(0.0082) (211.5)      
Patient Age -0.0044 *** -932 *** -0.0016 *** -373 ***
(0.0005) (73.2) (0.0003) (21.9)
(Patient Age)
2/100 0.0041 *** 1,032       *** 0.0015 *** 375 ***
(0.0004) (57.3) (0.0003) (17.8)
Hospital Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes





2 0.067 0.118 0.122 0.137
***,**,* Indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
¥
Note:
The total number of CABG cases in the CSRS database for the years from 1992 through 1996 is 90,130.  
Subtracting the 771 records with a missing value for at least one covariate yields the total number of 89,359 
included in the regression.  For PTCA, the total number of cases in the CARS data for 1994 and 1995 is 40,265.  
Subtracting the 151 cases missing at least one covariate yields the total of 40,114.
Results in Columns 1 and 3 are based on data from the CSRS and CARS databases.  Results in Columns 2 and 
4 are based on discharge data from SPARCS and cost data from Medicare PPS Cost Reports.  Column 2 
excludes cases with total charges less than $5,000, and Column 3 excludes cases with total charges less than 
$2,500.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Each regression includes a constant term which is not 
reported in this table. 
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Table 6: Calculation of Approximate Annual Change in Total Mortality and Cost for 
CABG and PTCA Due to All New York Acquisitions, 1992-1999 
 
Full Sample
To 3 Years 
Post-
Acquisition
To 2 Years 
Post-
Acquisition




Change in Mortality -                   -3.50 -                        
Change in Cost -                   -                   -                        
Volume-Outcome Effects
Change in Mortality -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
Change in Cost -$2,249 -$4,935 -$6,828
Total Change in Mortality -0.01 -3.52 -0.03
Total Change in Cost -$2,249 -$4,935 -$6,828
PTCA
Simple Redistribution
Change in Mortality 4.16              -                   5.99                  
Change in Cost -                   -                   -$3,477,118
Volume-Outcome Effects
Change in Mortality -                   -                   -                        
Change in Cost -$4,892 -$23,929 -$45,812
Total Change in Mortality 4.16 0.00 5.99
Total Change in Cost -$4,892 -$23,929 -$3,522,929
Note:
Balanced Panel
Calculations represent total changes across all acquisitions in New York from 
1992 through 1999.  Figures are based on coefficients from versions of (1) with 
hospital-specific quality and cost intercepts, respectively, as the dependent 
variable (for simple redistribution) and Table 5 (for volume-outcome effects). 
Data on the average annual volume of procedures at local acquirers, non-local 
acquirers, and non-acquirers is for 2000.  Dashes denote cases where the 
relevant coefficients used to calculate values are not statistically significant at 
better than the 10% level.   
42 
Appendix: Clinical Covariates Included in CABG and PTCA Mortality Regressions 
In CABG In PTCA
Variable Description Mortality Regression? Mortality Regression?
IS92 Dummy for year=1992 Yes No
IS93 Dummy for year=1993 Yes No
IS94 Dummy for year=1994 Yes Yes
IS95 Dummy for year=1995 Yes Yes
IS96 Dummy for year=1996 Yes No
AGE Patient age Yes Yes
AGEQUAD (AGE)
2/100 Yes Yes
ETHNIC Dummy for Hispanic Yes No
BSA Body surface area Yes Yes
ANGINA Angina: CCS functional class Yes Yes
NORISK Dummy for no pre-operative risk factors Yes No
MI_24HR Dummy for MI within previous 24 hours Yes Yes
MI_WEEK Dummy for MI within previous 1-7 days Yes Yes
PREVMI Dummy for any previous MI Yes Yes
MORE1MI Dummy for more than 1 previous MI No Yes
TRNSMMI Dummy for transmural MI Yes Yes
STROKE Dummy for stroke Yes Yes
CAROCERB Dummy for carotid/cerebrovascular disease Yes Yes
AORTO Dummy for aortoiliac disease Yes Yes
FEM_POP Dummy for femoral/popliteal Yes Yes
UNSTABLE Dummy for hemodynamic instability Yes Yes
SHOCK Dummy for shock Yes Yes
HYPTENS Dummy for hypertension history Yes Yes
IV_NTG Dummy for IV_NTG within 24 hours of operation Yes Yes
LVENTHT Dummy for left ventricular hypertrophy Yes Yes
MALVENAR Dummy for malignant ventricular arrhythmia Yes Yes
CHOBPUDS Dummy for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease Yes Yes
CPB Dummy for cardiopulmonary bypass at start of procedure No Yes
EXCAASAO Dummy for extensively calcified ascending aorta Yes No
DIABETES Dummy for diabetes requiring medication Yes Yes
IMSYSTDF Dummy for immune system deficiency Yes Yes
IABPPREO Dummy for IABP pre-op Yes Yes
ERDXCATH Dummy for emergency transfer to OR after cath Yes No
ERPTCA Dummy for emergency transfer to OR after PTCA Yes No
PREVCAAD Dummy for previous PTCA, this admission Yes Yes
CABEFORE Dummy for PTCA before this admission Yes Yes
THROMB Dummy for thrombolytic therapy within 7 days Yes Yes
SMOK2WK Dummy for smoking history in past 2 weeks Yes Yes
SMOK1YR Dummy for smoking history in past year No Yes
FEMALE Dummy for female Yes Yes
NONWHT Dummy for non-white Yes Yes
EMERGNCY Dummy for emergency surgical priority Yes No
EJFR20 Dummy for ejection fraction less than 20% Yes Yes
EJFR2029 Dummy for ejection fraction 20-29% Yes Yes
EJFR3039 Dummy for ejection fraction 30-39% Yes Yes
LMT Dummy for left main trunk, 50% or greater Yes Yes
PLAD Dummy for Prox LAD or Maj Diag, 70% or greater Yes Yes
MDLAD Dummy for Mid/Dist LAD or Maj Diag, 70% or greater Yes Yes
RCA Dummy for RCA or PDA, 70% or greater Yes Yes
LCX Dummy for LCA or Large Marg, 70% or greater Yes Yes
LESION B Dummy for Lesion Type B No Yes
LESIONC Dummy for Lesion Type C No Yes
CHF Dummy for congestive heart failure Yes Yes
RENFAIL Dummy for renal failure Yes Yes
PREVOHS Dummy for previous open heart operations Yes Yes
POSSTR Dummy for positive stress test No Yes
Note:
Regressions also include ln(lagged annual procedure volume) and hospital fixed effects.  The CAC provides the 
following caveat with respect to the use of the indicator for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD): "Prior 
to 1993, the definition used for COPD was considered subjective, and irregular frequency distributions across 
institutions were noted.  The definition was changed in 1993 to include documentation of objective clinical criteria.  
However, the wide range in COPD rates reported across hospitals remains, presumably due to practice patterns 
among various providers with regard to utilizing objective testing for COPD." 
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